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Abstract: 
This paper considers the problem of selecting the most economical target mean and variance for a continuous 
production process. In earlier studies, many authors considered the problem of finding an optimal target mean 
assuming that the variance is known. The problem with this assumption is the difficulty or impossibility of 
setting a target variance. Taguchi suggested a two-step procedure: first, set the target mean; then, find the 
smallest variance through redesign or experiment (resetting the level of factors). In this study, three new 
approaches are suggested for the economic selection of a target variance integrated with a target mean. In the 
first approach, an expected profit maximization criterion is used to obtain the target mean and variance 
simultaneously. The example used to illustrate this approach is a filling process where the quality characteristic 
is assumed to be normally distributed. The containers that are underfilled can be sold in a secondary market at a 
price of $PL per can, those within specification can be sold at a price of $P0 per can, and those over the upper 
specification limit can be sold at a price of $PU per can. In the second approach, a minimum cost criterion based 
on the Taguchi loss function is used: first, the processes optimized for the variance; then, an optimal process 
mean is obtained. In the third approach, an economic model for the selection of the target variance is developed, 
using both customer and producer costs to minimize societal loss independent of the product quality 
characteristic distribution. 
 
Keywords: Joint economic selection; Target mean; Target variance; Taguchi loss function 
 
Article: 
1 INTRODUCTION 
The filling process problem has received considerable attention from researchers in recent years. Springer [19] 
developed a method for determining the most economic position of a process mean. He considered a 
manufacturing process in which both upper and lower specification limits were of interest and in which the 
financial loss due to producing a product above the upper specification limit was not necessarily equal to the 
loss when producing one below the lower specification limit. He suggested a simple method for determining the 
optimum target mean to minimize the total cost. The distribution of the product quality characteristic was 
assumed to be normal. Bettes [2] studied a similar problem with a given lower specification limit; however, he 
assumed an arbitrary upper specification limit. Furthermore, he assumed undersized and oversized items are 
reprocessed at a fixed cost. Hunter and Kartha [12] investigated the optimization of a target mean when a lower 
specification is fixed: each item is inspected to determine whether it satisfies a lower specification limit. If it 
does, then that item is sold at the regular price; if it does not, the item is sold at a reduced price in a secondary 
market. Thus, the customer is compensated for poor quality but does not pay extra for excessive quality. A net 
income function consisting of income from the accepted items, the give-away cost of material in excess of the 
lower specification, and income from the rejected items was developed. Their study provides a simple 
procedure for obtaining the optimal process mean. Nelson [17] provided a similar solution to this problem. 
Bisgaard et al. [3] extended Hunter and Kartha’s [12] work to include the selection of the most favorable quality 
characteristic distribution for the product. Industrial examples of normal, lognormal, and Poisson distributed 
quality characteristics were provided. Carlsson [4] modified the work of Hunter and Kartha [12] to include both 
fixed and variable costs. He derived a revenue function whereby the customer pays extra for quality and is 
compensated for poor quality. Both Hunter and Kartha [12] and Carlsson [4] assume that rejected products are 
sold on a secondary market. Golhar [8] addressed the problem of finding the most economic setting of a process 
mean. He modelled a situation where over-filled cans could only be sold in a regular market and where the 
underfilled cans would be emptied and refilled, with the penalty of extra cost. Golhar and Pollock [9] extended 
this work to include an upper specification limit and provide solutions for determining both the optimal process 
mean and the upper specification limit. Schmidt and Pfeifer [18] considered the problem of the economic 
selection of the target mean and the upper limit for a canning process with limited capacity. Golhar and Pollock 
[10] studied a canning process to investigate the effect of a reduction in process variance on production cost. 
These studies may be considered as direct extensions of Springer’s work [19]. 
 
Montgomery [15] suggested a normally-distributed quality characteristic in which the profit function is related 
to conformity to upper and lower specifications. The profit obtained by a product below the lower limit is 
different from that obtained from a product above the upper limit. A common assumption in most of the above 
studies is that the process variability is known. Schmidt and Pfeifer [18] use Golhar’s model [8] to evaluate the 
economic effects of process variance reduction. Bai and Lee [1] studied a process where the lower specification 
limit of the quality characteristic is given and where each container is inspected on a surrogate variable 
correlated with the primary variable. The same type of problem was discussed by Tang and Ho [21]. Lee and 
Kim [14] extended the model of Bai and Lee [1] by including a controllable upper limit. The current trend is to 
consider both producers’ and customers’ costs and incorporate them into manufacturing optimization decisions. 
Genichi Taguchi’s views (see, Kakar [13]) on this aspect of quality control are perhaps the best known. His 
method has become popular because its premises are simple and easily understood. 
 
2 ECONOMIC SELECTION OF TARGET MEAN AND VARIANCE  
2.1 Expected Profit Criterion 
Assumption 
The product quality characteristic x is normally distributed with the density function f(x), mean μ, and variance 
σ
2
. If a product falls within specifications, the selling price is P0. However, if its quality characteristic is below 
or above the specification limits, the selling price is PL or PU respectively. Let Cm be the material cost per unit 
of product, and da exp(σ — d) be an exponential function which represents the cost of variance reduction. The 
problem is to find the joint optimal target mean µ and variance σ
2
. 
 
Model Development 
The expected profit per item is 
 
             
   
 
    
   
 
   
     
   
 
         
   
 
   
                                            
 
where ϕ(•) and Φ(•) are the standard normal probability density function and cumulative distribution function, 
respectively. 
 
Necessary conditions for optimality are 
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To obtain µ
*
 and σ
*
, Eqs. (2) and (3) must be solved, simultaneously. 
 
Numerical Example 
Let U = 20, L = 15, P0 = 10, PL = 5, PU = 7.75, Cm = 0.1, a = 2.96 and d = 1. 
 
When the above Eqs. (2) and (3) are solved simultaneously, the optimal solutions of mean µ and variance a2 
can be obtained. It is clear from looking at Eqs. (2) and (3) that these are cumbersome and mathematically 
involved to solve. Thus, an optimization search method was considered which used the gradients of the 
function, as well as the objective function values (Fletcher and Reeves' [6] gradient method). The unconstrained 
optimization search method of Hooke and Jeeves [11] was also used which requires only the evaluation of the 
objective function. Using both search methods, the same optimum solutions were obtained, and these 
are as follow: µ
*
 = 17.74 and σ
2*
 = 4.0. 
 
 
 
2.2 Expected Loss Criterion 
The previous section is a consideration of the problem of simultaneously determining the target mean and target 
variance for a process. This section describes the problem of simultaneously determining the target mean and 
target variance for a process in relationship to Taguchi's loss function. According to Taguchi [20], quality is 
measured by the deviation of a quality characteristic from its target value, even though it remains within the 
specification limits L and U. 
 
Consider a manufacturing process in which the dimension of the product quality, X, is normally distributed with 
a mean and variance σ
2
. Let the part specification have a target value of m. Thus, Taguchi's loss function is 
given by 
 
L(X) = K(X — m)
2
          (4) 
 
The expected loss function is 
 
E[L(X)] = KE(X — m)
2
 
= K[σ
2
 + ( — m)
2
]         (5) 
 
Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty [16] developed a model for determining optimal process variance according to 
the Taguchi loss function (the M-C model). In their study, a case is considered in which even though the 
process mean μ is on the target value m, the variance may increase over time. They assume that the quality of 
the output of the process is symmetrical around the process mean. The loss for onconforming parts, called 
rejection loss, is denoted by L1(σ); the Taguchi loss for conforming parts is denoted by L2(σ); and the variance 
reduction cost is denoted by C2(σ1, σ), where   
  is the current variance and σ
2
 is the target variance after the 
reduction. The reduction in variance from   
  to σ
2
 reduces both the rejection loss, L1(σ), and the Taguchi loss, 
L2(σ), but at a cost. There must be an optimum variance   
 ; any reduction beyond   
  is not worth the resultant 
savings. 
 
 
Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty [16] propose the following for normally distributed outputs. 
 
PROPOSITION 1 The rejection loss L1 (σ) is an increasing function of σ. 
 
PROPOSITION 2 The Taguchi loss L2 (σ) can increase or decrease depending on the parameters μ, σ, and K. 
 
Mukhopadhyay and Chakraborty [16] assume that the cost of rework for oversized and undersized parts is the 
same; however, in this paper, the costs of undersized and oversized parts are considered to be different. 
Therefore, the total cost associated with a nonconforming item for the proposed model is 
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Differentiating with respect to σ results in 
 
      
  
     
   
 
   
   
 
     
   
 
   
   
 
               
 
Since ϕ(•) > 0, L < μ and U > μ, then dL1(σ)=dσ > 0. It is easy to see that L1 (σ) is increasing in σ. 
 
Thus, Proposition 1 of the M-C model is applicable to the proposed model.  
 
Under Proposition 2, assuming symmetry and denoting Z = L – μ/σ, then 
 
L2σ = 2Kσ
2
(Zϕ(Z) + 1   (Z) – 1/2)  
 
= 2Kσ
2
(Zϕ(Z)   Φ(Z) – 1/2) 
 
Differentiation with respect to a results in 
 
      
  
                                
 
Thus, dL2(σ)/dσ > 0 if 1   2Φ >  Zϕ(Z)(2 + Z
2
): 
It can easily be verified that the above condition is true only when Z ≤  1:37, i.e., if L   μ* = σ* ≤  1:37. 
 
From the proposed model described in section 2.1, the results are as follows: L = 17; μ
*
 = 17:74, and σ
*
 = 2:00; 
substituting these into L   μ* = σ* results in exactly Z =  1:37. Therefore, Proposition 2 of the M-C model is 
also applicable and supports the proposed model. 
 
3 ECONOMIC SELECTION OF TARGET VARIANCE, INDEPENDENT OF PRODUCT QUALITY 
DISTRIBUTION 
There is a wide variety of optimization and variation reduction problems; one of these is the determination of 
the target value, and another is uniformity around the target value according to the Deming thought line. 
Optimization can be described as cooperation between the producer and the customer that results in reduction of 
variability, independent of the product quality characteristic distribution. Chen [5] states that reducing process 
variations can lead to increased customer satisfaction, but may result in higher costs to the manufacturer. On the 
other hand, larger allowable variations will adversely affect quality. The goal in design is to minimize the total 
societal loss, including the costs to the customer and the producer. 
 
Each production set-up is unique, and it is unrealistic to expect that a general equation that holds true in all 
instances can be derived. Intuition, however, suggests that a reduction in variance at any point in time can be 
accomplished by increasing production costs. This approach appears to conflict with the generally-held belief 
that variance reductions are accompanied by decreasing costs, for example, reductions in scrap rates. Overall 
decreases in production costs are a long-term effect that are accomplished by increased short-term expenditures 
in such things as new equipment, training, and=or increased inspection. Eventually, these costs are recoupled 
through increased efficiency, but over the short term they must be borne by the organization and should be 
factored into quality decisions. In the majority of instances, this improved performance may be characterized as 
a decrease in the variability of production. However, managers must balance purchase and operating costs 
against reduced process variation. 
 
It was assumed that producer costs increase non-linearly with a decrease in variability and can be represented 
by 
 
       
 
    
                               
 
This equation describes a non-linear function that has a maximum, v, and a minimum that tends to zero as the 
variance increases. The possibility of zero variance is best explained with an example derived from the canning 
problem discussed in Section 2. A producer who wishes to sell cans weighing exactly one kilogram can do so if 
he is willing to inspect all cans and reject those not meeting this criterion. If the scale used is sufficiently 
accurate, any deviations will be so small that they will be ignored by the customer. Thus, the producer achieves 
variance that effectively is zero at a cost of v. Of course, the cost of such an achievement is passed on to the 
consumer. 
 
The customer's cost of variance can also be expressed as a non-linear increasing function. This cost is 
represented by 
 
C(σ
2
) = m1 + m2σ + m3(σ
2
 + bias
2
)      (11) 
 
Eq. (11) is an example of the Taguchi loss function (see, Taguchi et al. [20]) because nominal is the best when 
the process mean is centered on the target value. In this case, m1 and m2 equal zero, and m3 = k such that 
 
C(σ
2
) = E[L(x)] = k(σ
2
 + bias
2
)      (12) 
 
 
 
According to Taguchi's loss function, the variance can be optimized, assuming that the process mean is on 
target (i.e., no process bias). Traditionally, reducing variations in product quality characteristics can lead to 
higher customer satisfaction. However, this reduction may also require higher-grade parts, materials, and 
production facilities, each of which results in a higher production cost. On the other hand, larger variations 
adversely affect quality and decrease the competitiveness of the manufacturer. Thus, an optimization must be 
established. The objective function of this model represents a societal loss TL, which includes a cost of variance 
to the customer C(σ
2
); the cost of the variance to the producer M(σ
2
) includes costs for the upgrading or for the 
tightening of the tolerance limits. Figures 2, 3, and 4 depict both the producer's and customer's costs and their 
sum, i.e., total cost in a general format. The total cost TL includes the cost of variance for both parties. 
 
 
 
 
If   
  is defined as the variance at the intersection of the two cost functions, C(σ
2
) and M(σ
2
), and   
  is defined 
as the minimum of the total cost TL, there are three possible outcomes: 
 
Outcome I,   
  =   
 ; 
Outcome II,   
  =   
 ; 
or Outcome III,   
  =   
 . 
 
In the case of Outcome I, the point at which the producer’s and customer’s costs are equal determines the 
optimal variance. When the crossover point is not the minimum of the total cost, a situation is created in which 
bargaining between the producer and the consumer is possible.  
 
3.1 Unequal Minimum and Crossover Point 
An interesting dilemma occurs when the minimum of the total costs and crossover point are at different values 
of sigma, as shown in Figures 3 and 4. Redefining the Taguchi quality loss as the sum of the costs to both the 
consumer and producer, and not just the customers’ costs (as is often done in the literature), creates a situation 
in which to minimize this cost both parties must operate at variances that clearly are not optimal for either of 
them. One of the major techniques of total quality management is producer/consumer cooperation. Clearly, 
neither party wishes to gain at the expense of the other because the trust necessary for this management 
technique would be destroyed. This situation is modeled in terms of cooperative game theory in which both 
players work together to achieve a result that is mutually beneficial. 
 
The problem is one of choosing whose interest takes precedence and determining a method of compensation 
(i.e., transfer utility) for the penalized party. If the total costs are minimized as shown in Figure 3 a situation 
arises where the producer can compensate the customer with the savings from the increased operating variance. 
The converse is true in Figure 4. Gitlow et al. [7], discussing a similar situation using the Taguchi loss function 
with the emphasis on the target mean, conclude that the total cost should subsume that of the players, i.e., the 
manufacturer and customer. Unfortunately, they do not discuss a method of compensating the penalized party. 
In general, this situation can be defined as follows. Let the cost of variance to the producer and the consumer be 
M(σ
2
) and C(σ
2
), respectively. M(σ
2
) is a monotonically decreasing function such that 
 
M
’
(σ
2
) < 0 ∀σ2     (13) 
 
and C(σ
2
) is a monotonically increasing function such that 
C
’
(σ
2
) > 0 ∀σ2      (14) 
 
Then, the following lemma is a sufficient condition to provide for an intersection of these two costs. 
 
LEMMA 1 If at σ
2
 = 0, C(σ
2
) < M(σ
2
), then there exists a   
  such that 
 
M(  
 ) = C(  
 )    (15) 
 
If society's cost, defined as T(σ
2
) = M(σ
2
) + C(σ
2
), is to have a minimum, then, at this point 
 
T
’
(σ
2
) = 0    (16) 
 
and 
 
T
”
(σ
2
) > 0    (17) 
 
which implies 
 
 
   
                                           
 
Also implying that, at the optimal variable   
 , 
 
      
   
   
  
        
   
                               
 
i.e., 
 
M
’
(  
 ) =  C’(  
 )     (20) 
 
Thus,   
  is obtained by solving Eq. (15), and   
  is obtained by solving Eq. (20). As previously mentioned,   
 , 
the intersection variance, does not have to equal   
 , the minimum of the total costs. 
 
It can be verified that if M(σ
2
) and C(σ
2
) are given by (10) and (12), respectively, then (15) reduces to 
 
 
    
     
                                                    
 
i.e., 
 
  
  
         
  
                                     
 
Similarly, (20) implies that at σ
2
 1/4   
 , 
 
 
 
   
 
 
    
   
 
   
                               
 
Hence, 
 
 
 
     
  
                                                       
 
and 
 
    
 
 
                                                        
 
Thus, for Outcome I to occur (i.e., for   
  to be equal to   
 ), (22) and (25) must be equal. In other words 
 
 
 
 
   
         
  
    
     
                 
 
Hence, Outcome II will occur if 
 
                                         
 
and Outcome III will occur if 
 
                                          
 
If side payments are not allowed or there is no mutually acceptable form of compensation and both parties are 
equally empowered, then   
 , is the solution of this problem, regardless of whether or not   
 , equals   
 . On the 
other hand, if a suitable transfer utility is agreed upon, then   
  becomes the optimal solution to the negotiation 
process because of its lower total cost. 
 
The proof that   
  is always superior or equal to   
  as a target variance (if side payments are allowed) is as 
follows: 
 
T(  
 ) ≤ T(  
 )       (29) 
 
and 
 
    
  –      
       
       
                  
 
thus 
 
     
       
         
       
              
 
The gain to one party in a move from   
  to   
  is equal to or greater than the loss to the other. In the instance of 
Outcome II or III, a portion of this gain can be used to induce the penalized party to move to this variance. 
 
For Outcome II,   
  <   
 , 
 
M(  
 ) > M(  
 ),      (32) 
and 
C(  
 ) < C(  
 ).      (33) 
 
Since T(  
 ) is less than T(  
 ), the reduction in total cost is T(  
 ) – T(  
 ). This reduction in cost can be shared 
in some fashion between the producer and the customer by transferring some of the customer's savings to the 
producer as an incentive for the producer to move to the target variance of   
 . 
 
If Outcome III occurs, then   
  >   
 . The producer should offer a part of the savings of T(  
 )   T(  
 ) to the 
customer as an incentive to move to the target variance. 
 
Thus, it is easy to see that if Outcomes II or III occur, negotiation between the producer and the customer, along 
with a transfer of savings from one party to the other, can lead to a target variance of   
 , which minimizes the 
total cost to society. The need for such negotiation is further highlighted by the following result. 
 
LEMMA 2 If both parameters v and k are chosen from two independent random variables, then the probability 
of occurrence of Outcome I is zero. 
 
Proof Assume that v and k are chosen from two independent random variables, V and K, where density 
functions, fv(v) and fk(k), respectively, are defined on the two sets, Sv, and Sk. Then, Outcome I will occur only if 
the event associated with (26) occurs. The probability of this happening is. 
 
                
 
  
 
 
where S1, is the set of values of v and k in the set (Sv x Sk) that satisfies (25). However, the set S is a one-
dimensional manifold and is a subset of the 2-dimensional set (Sv x Sk). Hence, the above integral would yield 
zero area under the joint distribution of v and k in the set S1. Therefore, there is zero chance that Outcome I will 
occur. 
 
The importance of Lemma 2 is best understood by noting that it accents the need for cooperation between the 
producer and the customer in almost all circumstances. Given the reasonable assumption that the producer and 
customer cost function parameters occur randomly and independently, it is highly unlikely that Outcome I will 
ever occur. Therefore, one would expect Outcomes II or III to occur, necessitating the need for negotiation 
between the two parties. As shown above, this negotiation can lead to the selection of a target variance that is 
―globally optimal‖ in the sense that it minimizes the societal cost; furthermore, both parties are better off with 
this negotiated solution. If such a negotiation does not take place, then globally optimal target variances can still 
be enforced through other mechanisms. These mechanisms are discussed in Section 3.2. 
 
3.2 Producer/Consumer Motivation for Minimum Selection 
If the total cost of variance is ignored, the intersection of the producer’s cost and the consumer’s cost will 
provide the target variance necessary for determining the optimal mean. If the total cost of variance is not 
ignored, the previous section proves that there are funds, transfer utility, available to facilitate the movement 
from the intersection variance,   
 , to the minimum variance,   
 . The question, then, becomes one of will: Is 
there a mechanism, either market or internal, that forces or encourages this movement? 
 
As shown in the next section, if the producer and consumer are part of the same organization, total cost 
consideration becomes paramount. In this instance, it would be illogical for the parties to ignore the minimum 
of the total cost. Any deviation from this point results in a loss that must be borne by the company and, 
ultimately, by the parties themselves. This threat of loss provides the impetues to move to minimum variance. 
 
If the parties are separate entities, however, this impetus no longer exists. Since the loss in efficiency caused by 
operating at a point other than the minimum variance is borne by the market as a whole, the motivation to move 
to the minimum of the total cost curve is effectively eliminated. Unfortunately, there is no direct means for the 
market to push the participants towards the optimal point. Although the capitalist system tends to eliminate 
inefficiencies through a process akin to natural selection, it usually does so only in ―perfectly competitive‖ 
markets. Given that a large number of producers and consumers is necessary to make negotiation attractive, it is 
unlikely that free market forces will apply. As a result, three possible mechanisms for the total cost curve take 
precedence. The first involves outside interference or regulation. Consider the case where product variance is 
directly related to an important societal value, for example, the level of pollution. In this case, it is conceivable 
that government regulation could force the producer and the consumer to the minimum of the total cost curve 
through legal or financial means. 
 
The second method is more circumspect. Although neither party wants to move to the minimum variance, both 
consider the possible outcomes of inaction. Markets tend to be protected from new entrants through entry 
barriers caused by the potential entrant’s lack of knowledge of the current operating environment, likely 
resulting in higher operating costs. However, if the possible savings of variance optimization are great enough, 
potential entrants could offset their increased operating costs by making an educated guess as to the value of the 
minimum variance. The room for acceptable error in this approximation increases with the magnitude of the 
savings available. Thus, if current producers and consumers wish to protect their positions in the market, then 
eliminating this inducement to outside organizations is rational. 
 
The third method involves outright purchase of one of the parties by the other in what is termed ―vertical 
integration‖. The purchaser realizes the savings offered by the increased variance efficiency. The 
implementation of this study’s proposed model for variance selection using the motivation of reduced 
organizational variance costs is outlined in the next section. 
 
3.3 Implementation 
The implementation of this model presupposes a producer and consumer who, although not necessarily well-
versed in the techniques of quality management, have some familiarity with it. This is not to say that using this 
model relieves participants of the responsibility of quality management; it doesn’t. Corporate quality 
implementation failures are often the result of management’s underestimation of the level of commitment 
required. 
 
Issues of quality management aside, assume that a company decides to implement this model in order to 
determine the optimal mean and variance levels of a number of products or quality characteristics. Since the 
determination of the target variance is independent of the underlying distribution of the quality characteristic, its 
determination is the logical place to start. 
 
Ideally, but not necessarily, the various departments should be set up as profit centers so that each is aware of its 
expenses. The task of quantifying the cost of variance may not be easy because of the high number of factors 
that influence this expense. This difficulty is reduced, however, if both the manufacturer and the consumer 
assume that Eq. (10) and (11) represent the general behavior of these costs. For the producer, there is only one 
point that needs to be defined to specify the cost of the variance function. If the cost associated with any 
variance is known, then the cost of zero variance, v, can be determined using Eq. (10). Unfortunately, the task is 
not as simple for the consumer: Eq. (11) needs three cost-of-variance points to completely define it. The 
complexity is reduced, however, by using Eq. (5), which is the Taguchi loss function. In this case, one point is 
sufficient for quantifying the consumer’s cost of variance. 
 
Once both parties agree on a target variance (after analysis and prioritization of individual costs), the producer 
determines a target mean. Depending on the quality characteristic probability distribution and the nature of the 
tolerance limits (whether upper, lower, or both), a mathematical treatment can be chosen. The producer uses the 
agreed-upon variance in the applicable equations. In addition, if the producer follows the Taguchi philosophy of 
quality control, tolerance limits can be tightened based on what is learned from the consumer in the same 
manner as discussed earlier in Section 3.1. As shown in Section 3.1, the variance chosen may not be optimal for 
both parties; it may be imposed by an outside body, in this case the organization as a whole. If this is the case, 
then some method of compensation for the penalized party must be determined and incorporated into the 
transfer pricing system that accompanies the set-up of profit centers within an organization. If the consumer and 
producer are separate business entities, the method of compensation (i.e., transfer utility) would, in all 
likelihood, be monetary. 
 
As in most models of quality management, the expectations of both the producer and consumer may be the most 
important feature. Understanding the impact of variance or quality decisions on consumer and producer costs is 
an important step for any organization and may itself be sufficient justification for the use of this model. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In this paper, three approaches for determining optimal target mean and target variance are considered. The first 
approach considers the problem of determining optimal settings for the mean and variance of a process so that 
the total profit is maximum. In the second approach, the variance is optimized based on Taguchi’s loss function. 
However, in both of these approaches it is assumed that the product quality characteristic is normally 
distributed, whereas in the third approach the variance is optimized based on producer and customer costs that 
are independent of product quality distribution. 
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